{"id":14,"date":"2021-11-24T16:09:59","date_gmt":"2021-11-24T16:09:59","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/?page_id=14"},"modified":"2026-03-15T19:55:26","modified_gmt":"2026-03-15T19:55:26","slug":"richard-wolfram-esq","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/","title":{"rendered":"Richard Wolfram, Esq."},"content":{"rendered":"\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image is-resized\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"800\" height=\"114\" src=\"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/darkblue_house-1.png\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-16\" style=\"width:643px;height:90px\" srcset=\"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/darkblue_house-1.png 800w, https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/darkblue_house-1-300x43.png 300w, https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/11\/darkblue_house-1-768x109.png 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 767px) 89vw, (max-width: 1000px) 54vw, (max-width: 1071px) 543px, 580px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-9d6595d7 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\" style=\"flex-basis:50%\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column has-small-font-size is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Richard Wolfram is an independent U.S. lawyer based in New York City.&nbsp; His practice, launched in 2005,&nbsp;focuses on antitrust counseling and litigation on behalf of corporations, professional organizations and public advocacy entities.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Drawing on his 36 years of experience in antitrust and 39 years&nbsp;in&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/home\/admin\">commercial litigation<\/a>, Mr. Wolfram&nbsp;focuses on helping each client achieve its objectives through effective, cost-efficient counseling and\/or litigation.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">The constructive use of antitrust to achieve\nthese ends often requires&nbsp;&#8216;problem solving&#8217; &#8212; taking apart a client&#8217;s\nconcrete&nbsp;issues, identifying the antitrust component and using this legal\ntool to the client&#8217;s advantage, whether as a plaintiff, defendant,&nbsp;<em>amicus&nbsp;<\/em>(friend\nof the court) or interested observer (e.g., consulting on behalf of investors\nregarding mergers and other civil litigation matters).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Technology and business practices\ncontinue&nbsp;to undergo rapid transformation.&nbsp; To address today&#8217;s\neconomic and commercial realities, the effective advocate can&nbsp;use the law\ncreatively, when necessary,&nbsp; to persuade courts and other enforcers to\nembrace somewhat novel&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/home\/admin\">applications<\/a>&nbsp;of established principles, provided he or she\nrespects&nbsp;the fundamentals and thoroughly marshals&nbsp;the supporting\nfacts.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Mr. Wolfram&#8217;s representations have\nconsistently involved cutting-edge issues in high-profile matters. &nbsp;Recent\nexamples include an exclusive dealing\/tying\/monopolization suit in healthcare\nwhich has elicited a rare Statement of Interest by the Department of Justice\nsupporting legal arguments by the plaintiff-client; successfully negotiated\nclaims by a major European vehicle manufacturer against shipping carriers in\nthe worldwide &#8216;Roll-On-Roll-Off&#8217; cartel investigation, involving\nfirst-impression substantive and procedural issues at the interface of federal\nand state antitrust law and the federal Shipping Act; a concerted refusal to\ndeal case (in which the Supreme Court denied&nbsp;<em>certiorari)<\/em>&nbsp;raising\nunresolved questions among the circuit courts over the widespread but often\nmisapplied&nbsp;<em>Matsushita<\/em>&nbsp;standard for surviving summary judgment\nin antitrust cases; and an amicus brief in the LIBOR litigation on behalf of\neconomists and antitrust professors explaining why, contrary to the district\ncourt, plaintiffs satisfied the antitrust injury requirement, contributing to\nreversal by the Second Circuit and subsequent substantial settlements and also\nclass certification for OTC plaintiffs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">In addition to his solo representation of\nclients, Mr. Wolfram sometimes teams up with other antitrust&nbsp; lawyers and\nis also called upon by firms seeking antitrust expertise for their\nclients.&nbsp; Responsiveness and depth of experience and expertise are highly\nvalued by clients, across a range of antitrust issues, and a lean practice\nmodel with flexibility for collaboration helps address these needs.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">&nbsp;&#8212; These are some of the key components\nof Mr. Wolfram&#8217;s&nbsp;antitrust &#8216;toolbox&#8217;.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Antitrust addresses both&nbsp;single-firm and\njoint conduct.&nbsp; Across&nbsp;these categories,&nbsp;Mr Wolfram advises and\nlitigates on:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>mergers and\nacquisitions;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>joint ventures;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>monopolization;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>price-fixing, market\ndivision and concerted refusals to deal\/boycotts;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>distribution (e.g.,\nexclusive&nbsp;dealing, tying and resale price maintenance);<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>price discrimination;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>standard setting and\npatent pools;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>intellectual property\nlicensing and&nbsp;related antitrust\/intellectual property issues such as\npatent misuse; and<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>international antitrust.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Antitrust compliance review in these areas is\nalso a key component of his counseling.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Mr. Wolfram has published&nbsp;widely&nbsp;on a number of\nantitrust topics in U.S. and foreign publications&nbsp;since 1995&nbsp;and has\nguest-lectured and spoken at conferences on antitrust.&nbsp; The range and\ndepth of his writing and speaking are an important facet of his ability to\ndeliver&nbsp;results for his clients.&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">He has practiced predominantly in antitrust\nsince 1995, including nine years at Clifford Chance\/Rogers &amp; Wells in New\nYork City.&nbsp; From 1985 to 1995, Mr. Wolfram worked as an associate in\ncommercial litigation at several large and medium-sized international firms in\nNew York.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">More information about Mr. Wolfram&#8217;s practice, including representative matters, related experience and educational background, a bibliography and contact information, is available below.&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<div class=\"wp-block-column has-small-font-size is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-columns is-layout-flex wp-container-core-columns-is-layout-9d6595d7 wp-block-columns-is-layout-flex\">\n<div class=\"wp-block-column is-layout-flow wp-block-column-is-layout-flow\" style=\"flex-basis:100%\">\n<p><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<p><strong>RECENT NEWS<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>March 12, 2026:  &#8220;<strong>CNN\u2019s Viewpoint Diversity Could Factor in Paramount-WBD Sign-Off<\/strong>&#8221; (Bloomberg &#8211; Insight) (discussing possible further antitrust considerations, including by the states, and noting that viewpoint diversity across the media landscape, to which CNN contributes, is a well-recognized non-economic form of competition and antitrust &#8216;value&#8217;) (<em>Available at<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/news.bloomberglaw.com\/legal-exchange-insights-and-commentary\/cnns-viewpoint-diversity-could-factor-in-paramount-wbd-sign-off\">https:\/\/news.bloomberglaw.com\/legal-exchange-insights-and-commentary\/cnns-viewpoint-diversity-could-factor-in-paramount-wbd-sign-off<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Feb. 25, 2026, <strong>&#8220;Expert Analysis &#8212; Rebuttal:  Substantial Legal Grounds Supported HPE-Juniper Challenge,&#8221;<\/strong> Law 360 (rebutting previous Expert Analysis that DOJ lacked evidentiary support for its challenge, citing various antitrust grounds and outside interference as primary reason for settlement). (<em>Available at<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/www.law360.com\/articles\/2445615\/print?section=competition\">https:\/\/www.law360.com\/articles\/2445615\/print?section=competition<\/a>.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Feb. 20, 2026, <strong>Comment in Forbes, &#8220;Paramount Says It Cleared DOJ Review for Warner Bros. Bid &#8212; But There&#8217;s A Long Way to Go&#8221;<\/strong> (&#8220;Richard Wolfram, a lawyer specializing in antitrust law, told Forbes Hyman was essentially correct, and the end of the statutory waiting period does not equate to DOJ approval, noting the DOJ can sue to block the acquisition any time after the waiting period is up.&#8221;) (Available at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/antoniopequenoiv\/2026\/02\/20\/paramount-says-it-cleared-doj-review-for-warner-bros-bid-but-theres-a-long-way-to-go\/.\">https:\/\/www.forbes.com\/sites\/antoniopequenoiv\/2026\/02\/20\/paramount-says-it-cleared-doj-review-for-warner-bros-bid-but-theres-a-long-way-to-go)..<\/a><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Feb. 5, 2026, <strong>&#8220;Netflix Appears to Face Greater Antitrust Barriers to Acquiring Warner Bros. Discovery Than Paramount,&#8221;<\/strong> Promarket (available at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.promarket.org\/2026\/02\/05\/netflix-appears-to-face-greater-antitrust-barriers-to-acquiring-warner-bros-discovery-than-paramount\/\">https:\/\/www.promarket.org\/2026\/02\/05\/netflix-appears-to-face-greater-antitrust-barriers-to-acquiring-warner-bros-discovery-than-paramount\/<\/a>.) (This is my most recent of three articles cautioning,&nbsp;<em>inter alia<\/em>, about the hazards of political interference in government antitrust enforcement. The article concludes as follows: &#8220;Prominent antitrust commentators, among many others, have&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.promarket.org\/2025\/10\/28\/resisting-the-politicization-of-antitrust-and-regulation\/?utm_source=chatgpt.com\">raised concerns<\/a>&nbsp;about the injection of partisan \u201cnon-antitrust\u201d considerations into recent enforcement. [. . . ] A key question for the antitrust mission is whether the review will, in practice, stick to the script.&#8221; Now, with the departure on February 12th of Gail Slater as Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust at the Department of Justice, my cautionary note is, immediately, all the more fraught.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>There have been calls for the Antitrust Section of the ABA to issue a statement: It is widely known that the Division has been excluded and overridden on several antitrust matters by non-antitrust DOJ officials. AAG Slater&#8217;s departure is almost certainly due to being repeatedly undercut. I posted the following on Linkedin on the 12th because it is imperative that rigorous. fact and law-based antitrust be enforced by the government: &#8220;In the name of rigorous and legitimate government antitrust enforcement, as an essential check on AND protector of capitalism, including &#8216;economic democracy&#8217;, I do believe it&#8217;s time for the Division and the ABA itself to speak up. Interested entities\/persons should be sounding the alarm, whether big tech, little tech, entrepreneurs, defendants and plaintiffs. We (attys) are naturally &#8212; or trained to be &#8212; judicious and circumspect, and so we hold our tongues\/pens\/keyboard . . . . But comes a time when we have to speak up. Seems to me that time is now. Because this, once again, is all about the rule of law.&#8221;<br><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Dec. 19, 2025: <strong>\u201c<em>Philadelphia National Bank<\/em>&nbsp;and the Continuing Role of Structural Presumptions in Merger Review,\u201d<\/strong> Law.com.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>May 13, 2025: <strong>&#8220;DOJ Antitrust Takes a Populist Turn Under Gail Slater,&#8221;<\/strong> The National Law Journal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>May 7, 2024:  <strong>DOJ v. Apple . . . and <em>Trinko<\/em> (S.Ct. 2004) &#8212; Prof. Herb Hovenkamp weighs in.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>(I posted the following to Linkedin today.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>FYI: Recent comment by Professor Herb Hovenkamp on DOJ&#8217;s suit against Apple, in particular suggesting need to reconsider <em>Trinko<\/em>&#8216;s prior-course-of-dealing requirement as condition for liability for unilateral refusal to deal by monopolist in tech\/digital platform context:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>The comment appeared in an April 2 article entitled &#8220;Consumer Welfare Will Determine the Outcome of the Apple Lawsuit&#8221; along with posts also by Professors Maurice Stucke, Fiona Scott-Morton and Randy Picker, all of which I recommend, available here (link to Hovenkamp article and links at the bottom to the other three): <a href=\"https:\/\/lnkd.in\/eG-iuCKS\">https:\/\/lnkd.in\/eG-iuCKS<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>Per the heading above, here&#8217;s the relevant excerpt from the Hovenkamp article (focus: &#8220;One is a requirement that the defendant reneged on a previous voluntary course of dealing. [. . .] These rules are outmoded for dominated digital networks that have multiple firms as participants.)&#8221;:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>&#8220;The iPhone is a platform used by nearly 100 million Americans, not only to make calls but also as a window into commerce. One important question is how arbitrary its owner can be in choosing the businesses who operate on it. Apple has developed its own ecosystem of complementary products that is less accessible to rivals than the government thinks it should be. The complaint is couched in the antitrust language of refusal to deal, but that legal doctrine faces formidable hurdles. One is a requirement that the defendant&nbsp;reneged&nbsp;on a&nbsp;previous voluntary course&nbsp;of dealing. These rules are outmoded for dominated digital networks that have multiple firms as participants. The participants in such networks need to cooperate in order to achieve their purpose, and antitrust is relevant when unreasonable restrictions impede that in a way that furthers monopoly. A better rule would condemn unjustified refusals that create or prolong dominance in the secondary market. Nevertheless, only the Supreme Court can change the existing rules.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>June 21, 2023:  <strong>Comment to FTC re Competitive Implications of Cloud Services<\/strong>:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>In response to a March 22<sup>nd<\/sup>, 2023 Request for Information on the business practices of cloud computing providers, David Balto and I filed a Comment in our personal capacities focusing on one of the FTC\u2019s RFI questions \u2013 market power and business practices affecting competition in cloud computing.&nbsp; For context, the Comment notes \u201cthe outsized importance and rapid growth of cloud services, as firms, institutions and private consumers worldwide, including of course in the U.S., have increasingly digitized their operations over the past few years, moving their digital computing off-premises and into the cloud (i.e., data centers) for greater capacity, resiliency and security.&nbsp; Chief among the services on which these entities rely is software, and in particular, business software suites, so that with this transition into the cloud, the software operates in effect in the cloud.\u201d&nbsp; More particularly, \u201cany firm vertically integrated through the provision of software and cloud infrastructure\/platform services is uniquely positioned to leverage power it may have in the relevant software market\/s to acquire and\/or maintain power in the cloud infrastructure market. [. . .]&nbsp; To the extent a vertically integrated firm acquires such power in the infrastructure market largely or solely thanks to its power in the first, adjacent software, market instead of on the merits, competition is distorted and antitrust scrutiny and perhaps intervention are warranted.\u201d&nbsp; The Comment continues with detailed analysis and examples, here, https:\/\/www.regulations.gov\/comment\/FTC-2023-0028-0091, and available at https:\/\/www.regulations.gov\/docket\/FTC-2023-0028\/comments , along with some 89 other comments, including from Amazon, Oracle, Google and Microsoft.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p>March 2, 2022:  <strong>Letter from Kyiv &#8212; Letter to the editor enclosing letter from Ukrainian competition lawyers, with message to Russians, <\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/greenwichfreepress.com\/news\/letter-from-the-front-lines-kyiv-176232\/\">https:\/\/greenwichfreepress.com\/news\/letter-from-the-front-lines-kyiv-176232\/<\/a><strong>.<\/strong> <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">June 12, 2020:&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Led ABA Antitrust Section Zoom Program on Assessing Oligopolistic Conscious Parallelism on Summary Judgment:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Conceived, organized\nand led ABA Antitrust Section program on oligopolistic conscious parallelism on\nsummary judgment, in light of Supreme Court&#8217;s&nbsp;<em>Matsushita<\/em>&nbsp;(1986)\nand&nbsp;<em>Kodak<\/em>&nbsp;(1992) decisions and focusing on two cases decided\non virtually identical facts and allegations of price fixing, with opposite\nholdings:&nbsp;&nbsp;<em>Valspar v. DuPont<\/em>&nbsp;(3d Cir. 2017), granting\nsummary judgment, and&nbsp;<em>In Re Titanium Dioxide<\/em>&nbsp;(D. Md. 2015),\ndenying summary judgment.&nbsp; Panelists, including the dissenting judge\nin&nbsp;<em>Valspar<\/em>, engaged in mock oral argument.&nbsp; Program recording\n(Zoom) available on the Antitrust Section website or contact RW.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">February 9, 2020:&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>DOJ Antitrust\nDivision Closes Investigation of Four Automakers for Alleged Collusion.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>The Division reportedly just closed its investigation &#8212; i.e., without taking action &#8212; of Ford, Volkswagen, Honda and BMW for their framework agreement with California on vehicle emissions standards. In my Oct. 15th and Nov. 7th posts\/articles (see below), I raised questions &#8212; and noted similar questions from other antitrust attorneys &#8212; about the basis for the investigation, which the AAG for Antitrust said was focused on possible collusion.&nbsp; The relatively short period of time from the announcement in early fall of the opening of the investigation to its closing is noteworthy.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>November 28, 2024 update:<\/em>  Firms should be prepared for the renewed weaponization of antitrust in the incoming Trump administration to suppress environmental regulation and in particular standard setting, such as by the car manufacturers in the 2020 investigation.   Recent initiatives\/reports by the Republican majority in the House Judiciary Committee in this direction will very likely now find a more receptive audience among federal antitrust enforcers, consistent with the incoming president&#8217;s express hostility to environmental regulation.    Not only the environment but in my view also firms themselves will find they are ultimately ill-served by such efforts.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">November 21, 2019:&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Presented CLE\nProgram.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>&#8220;Antitrust Issues\nand Developments&#8221;&nbsp;&#8212; 100-minute audio program (Celesq Programs in\nPartnership with Thomson Reuters\/West).&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.celesq.com\/programs\/view\/antitrust\">https:\/\/www.celesq.com\/programs\/view\/antitrust<\/a>?.For access, possible CLE credit, contact RW.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">November 7, 2019:&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Article on\nMotion to Intervene by 12 Carmarkers in Support of Trump Administration on\nUniform Federal Emissions Standards (questioning whether the DOJ will\ninvestigate)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Available at the\nWolters-Kluwer Antitrust Connect blog:&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/antitrustconnect.com\/2019\/11\/07\/twelve-other-carmakers-move-to-support-government-enforcement-of-uniform-federal-standards-on-emissions-will-the-doj-investigate\/\">http:\/\/antitrustconnect.com\/2019\/11\/07\/twelve-other-carmakers-move-to-support-government-enforcement-of-uniform-federal-standards-on-emissions-will-the-doj-investigate\/<\/a>?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">October 15, 2019:&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Article on\nDOJ&#8217;s Investigation of Car Manufacturers&#8217; Agreement with California on\nEmissions and MPG Standards<\/strong>&nbsp;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Available at the Wolters-Kluwer Antitrust Connect blog:&nbsp; http:\/\/antitrustconnect\/2019\/10\/15\/the-doj-investigates-car-manufacturers-for-collusion-in-their framework-agreement-with-california-on-gas-mileage-and-emissions-standards-sounding-the-depths-of-prosecutorial-discret\/.&nbsp; Also available at the e-Competition Bulletin of&nbsp;<em>Concurrences<\/em>:&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/www.concurrences.com\/en\/bulletin\/news-issues\/october-2019\/the-us-doj-opens-an-investigation-of-four-car-manufacturers-for-possible\">https:\/\/www.concurrences.com\/en\/bulletin\/news-issues\/october-2019\/the-us-doj-opens-an-investigation-of-four-car-manufacturers-for-possible<\/a>?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">February 2019: &nbsp;<strong>Presented in two\nantitrust CLE programs.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Feb. 27:\n&nbsp;Participated in NY State Bar 90-minute CLE program with two other\nantitrust attorneys on parallel conduct, &#8216;plus factors&#8217; and the summary judgment\nstandard in antitrust conspiracy cases. For more information and free video\naccess, contact RW.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>Feb. 21:\n&nbsp;Organized and participated in Lawline &#8216;hot topics&#8217; 90-minute video CLE\nprogram with two fellow antitrust attorneys, an antitrust economist and an IP\nattorney. For more information and free video access, including possible CLE\ncredit, contact RW.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">February 2018: &nbsp;<strong>DOJ files Statement of\nInterest in Marion Healthcare v. Southern Illinois Healthcare (S.D. Ill.)\nregarding proper assessment of antitrust exclusive dealing claims.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Feb. 9: &nbsp;DOJ\nfiled Statement of Interest (SOI) at summary judgment phase of client Marion&#8217;s\nhealthcare exclusive dealing (and tying and monopolization) action, rejecting\nwhat the government perceives as overbroad defense of healthcare\nprovider-insurer contracts alleged to be exclusive. The DOJ rarely files SOIs\nin antitrust cases, thus reflecting its interest here in a proper reading of\nthe law. &nbsp;While taking no position on the merits, the SOI rejects\ndefendant&#8217;s arguments that short-term exclusive contracts are legal as a matter\nof law rather than subject to the rule of reason. Article&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Marion_Healthcare_-_articles_-_Law360_re_DOJ_SOI_-_22018.62210954.doc\">here<\/a>; SOI&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Marion_Healthcare_-_summary_judgment_-_DOJ_Statement_of_Interest_-_2918.62211315.pdf\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>April 10,\n2018:&nbsp;Oral argument on defendant&#8217;s motion for summary judgment (S. D.\nIll., East St. Louis Div.).&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">March 2017: &nbsp;<strong>Petition for certiorari\nfiled with U.S. Supreme Court regarding summary judgment standard in antitrust.\n&nbsp;Petition denied, Oct. 2, 2017.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>March 17: &nbsp;Filed\npetition on behalf of Evergreen Partnering seeking reversal of First Circuit\nCourt of Appeals summary judgment decision. &nbsp;See below for petition.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li><em>Update:<\/em>&nbsp;&nbsp;April 21-&nbsp;<em>Amicus<\/em>&nbsp;brief\nsigned by 12 professors of antitrust and economics supporting petition for\ncertiorari filed with Supreme Court. &nbsp;See below for brief.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>May 23: &nbsp;Petition\nfor certiorari posted as &#8220;Petition of the Day&#8221; on SCOTUS blog.\n&nbsp;See http:\/\/www.scotusblog.com.?<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>June 14: &nbsp;Article\nin&nbsp;<em>Policy and Regulatory Report<\/em>&nbsp;discussing Evergreen&#8217;s\nrationale for why petition is cert-worthy, with comments from observers,&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_articles_-_PaRR_14_June_2017.177161306.doc\">here<\/a>.&nbsp;<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>September 15:\n&nbsp;Filed Reply brief on behalf of Evergreen in response to Respondents&#8217;\nOpposition &#8212;&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_Reply_-_final_book_v4_-_914.260150144.pdf\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>October 2:\n&nbsp;Supreme Court denied Evergreen&#8217;s petition, without comment. &nbsp;RW\ncomment, at invitation of legal press: &nbsp;&#8220;The Court lost an important\nand timely opportunity to clarify an issue that has created tremendous\nconfusion and inconsistency among the circuits &#8212; the proper tools for applying\nthe summary judgment standard in antitrust. &nbsp;Although the Court understandably\nfocuses on issues of law and not fact for petitions that it accepts, one has to\nwonder what set of facts &#8212; with the lower court here improperly weighing\nevidence and making crediblity determinations and applying the much-criticized\nequal inferences rule &#8212; would serve as a better vehicle for resolving this\nquestion. &nbsp;This issue is not going away, and anyone who practices\nantitrust knows that.&#8221; Click&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_denial_of_petition_-_Wolters_Kluwer_article_-_10217.27893733.pdf\">here<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_denial_of_cert_-_Law360_article_-_10217.27893823.doc\">here<\/a>&nbsp;for articles about the decision. &nbsp;Confirming this\ncomment, and on the same day, a panel of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals\npublicly issued a decision affirming summary judgment dismissal of a Sherman\nAct Section 1oligopoly conspiracy case despite findings of 31 uniform price\nincreases by defendants over 11 years, well over any increase in costs and\ndespite declining demand and excess capacity. &nbsp;<em>Valspar Corp. v. Dupont\n&nbsp;(<\/em>3d Cir., 10\/2\/17). Arguably pre-empting the role of the trier of\nfact, just as Evergreen alleged the First Circuit did in its case, the Third\nCircuit panel required that the plaintiff provide inferences that the alleged\nconspiracy was &#8220;more likely than not&#8221; rather than applying the\ngeneral summary judgment standard, as repeated by the Supreme Court in&nbsp;<em>Kodak<\/em>,\nthat the plaintiff show simply that a jury could&nbsp;<em>reasonably<\/em>&nbsp;find\nin favor of the plaintiff. &nbsp;The plaintiff&#8217;s burden at trial is to prove\nits case by a preponderance of evidence (51%), whereas its burden on summary\njudment is simply to show that a jury could reasonably find in its favor &#8212;\nwhich the Supreme Court itself has explained is less than the preponderance\nstandard. &nbsp;As Evergreen explained in its petition, and as applies equally\nin&nbsp;<em>Valspar<\/em>, to require that the plaintiff show by a preponderance\nof evidence on summary judgment that a jury would find in its favor front-loads\nthe preponderance burden, effectively pre-empts the role of the jury, infringes\non the Seventh Amendment right of the plaintiff, and is illogical, raising the\nbar by requiring that the plaintiff satisfy the preponderance standard at both\nthe summary judgment phase and at trial.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">August 2016. &nbsp;<strong>FTC closes non-public\ninvestigation with favorable resolution for client.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Represented company\nproviding educational software for teacher evaluation in 4+ year non-public\ninvestigation by FTC of alleged unfair methods of competition under Sect. 5 of\nthe FTC Act. &nbsp;Represented company first as complainant and then, after it\nacquired the target of the investigation, as respondent. FTC closed the\ninvestigation in August 2016 with successful outcome for client.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">June 2016: &nbsp;<strong>Commentary on Brexit vote.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Commentary in Law360\npublication on competition law implications of Brexit vote.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">May 23, 2016. &nbsp;<strong>In Re\nLIBOR&nbsp;(Gelboim v. Bank of America)&nbsp;(2d Cir.).<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A unanimous panel of\nthe Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the district court&#8217;s March\n2013 decision granting defendants&#8217; motions to dismiss plaintiffs&#8217; claims of\nprice-fixing in the setting of LIBOR, the daily interest rate benchmark. The\nCourt substantially adopted the arguments of the plaintiffs and the&nbsp;<em>amici<\/em>&nbsp;seeking\nreversal,&nbsp;<strong>including RW&nbsp;<em>amicus<\/em>&nbsp;on behalf of 17\nprofessors of antitrust and eocnomics<\/strong>. &nbsp;In remanding to the district\ncourt, the Court noted that damages assessed on any ultimate finding of\nliability could be so great as to bankrupt several of the defendant banks. In\npractical effect and for its clear endorsement of major legal principles of\nantitrust, the decision is arguably the most important in antitrust so far this\nyear. &nbsp;Short summary of the decision&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Libor_-_decision_on_appeal_-_Clients_and_Friends_note_-_52316.146193759.doc\">here<\/a>.\n&nbsp;Article in&nbsp;<em>Policy and Regulatory Report<\/em>&nbsp;with RW\ncomment&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Libor_-_Defendant-Appellees_brief_-_71715.146193852.pdf\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">May 5, 2016. &nbsp;<strong>Evergreen Partnering v.\nPactiv, 1st Circuit Court of Appeals.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Presented oral argument\nin federal First Circuit Court of Appeals on behalf of plaintiff-appellant\nEvergreen, seeking reversal of summary judgment decision below. &nbsp;Evergreen\nalleges that defendants violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act through a\nconcerted refusal to deal concerning its effort to introduce recycling for\npolystyrene food service products (cups, trays, etc.) made by defendants.\n&nbsp;The First Circuit previously reversed a decision by the district court\ndismissing the case on defendants&#8217; motions to dismiss,&nbsp;finding that the\nlower court had misconstrued the threshold pleading standard of&nbsp;<em>Bell\nAtlantic Corp. v.&nbsp;Twombly<\/em>.? Following discovery,\nthe district court granted defendants&#8217; motion for summary judgment.&nbsp;<strong><em>Update:<\/em><\/strong>&nbsp;&nbsp;Court\nof Appeals upheld the district court&#8217;s summary judgment decision (8\/2\/16).\nEvergreen filed a petition for rehearing by the panel with a suggestion for\nrehearing en banc (9\/21\/16). The Court then denied the petition in an order\nwith no opinion (10.18.16). &nbsp;Article on the denial, with comment by\nRW,&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_Order_denying_petition_for_rehearing_-_Law360_article_-_102016.293194141.doc\">here<\/a>. &nbsp;<strong>On March 17, 2017<\/strong>, Evergreen filed a&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_FINAL_printed_pdf_-_317.91210048.pdf\">petition for certiorari<\/a>&nbsp;with the Supreme Court. &nbsp;Evergreen\ncontends that the First Circuit misinterpreted and misapplied the&nbsp;<em>Matsushita<\/em>&nbsp;(1986)\nstandard for summary judgment and that there is split among the Circuits\nrequiring clarification in light of the Court&#8217;s limitation of the&nbsp;<em>Matsushita<\/em>&nbsp;standard\nin the Court&#8217;s decision in&nbsp;<em>Kodak&nbsp;<\/em>(1992). &nbsp;On April 21st,\nan&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Evergreen_-_petition_for_cert_-_amicus_-_FILED_-_42117.119222821.pdf\"><em>amicus&nbsp;<\/em>brief<\/a>&nbsp;signed by 12 professors of antitrust and economics\nsupporting the petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court.&nbsp;\n&nbsp;<strong>???<\/strong><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Sept. 2015.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Endo-Par $8 B generic\npharmaceuticals merger provisionally approved by FTC on Sept. 25th, subject to\ndivestitures.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Represented Rising\nPharmaceuticals as acquirer&nbsp; of certain generics required to be divested\nas condition of approval of the merger by the FTC.&nbsp; Article&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Rising_Pharma_-_Complaw360_article_-_92515.271164412.doc\">here<\/a>. &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">May 27, 2015.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong><em>In Re\nLIBOR:&nbsp;<\/em>&nbsp;amicus brief filing on behalf of 17 antitrust scholars in\nCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Authored and\nfiled&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/LIBOR_-_amicus_-_FILED_FINAL_-_13-3565-cvL_In_Re_LIBOR-based_Financial_Instruments_Antitrust_Litigation_Brief_for_Amici_Curiae_Scholars.152222804.pdf\">amicus brief<\/a>&nbsp;on behalf of 17 antitrust scholars &#8212;\nprofessors of law and economics &#8212; supporting plaintiffs&#8217; appeal in the Second\nCircuit of the district court&#8217;s March 2013 dismissal of the Section 1, Sherman\nAct claims for lack of antitrust injury.&nbsp; Summary description&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/LIBOR_-_Friends_and_Clients_e-mail_doc_re_amicus_-_52815.152222931.doc\">here<\/a>.<br>\n<br>\n<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">April 7-10, 2015.&nbsp;<strong>Americas\nInterconnection Summit, San Diego, organized by client Open-IX.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Antitrust compliance\npresentation to participants (i.e., Internet participants interested in\ninterconnection, including ISPs, content providers, content delivery networks,\ndata center and internet exchange operators, and related network software and\nhardware providers).&nbsp; See www.open-ix.org.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Jan. 28, 2015.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong><em>In re LIBOR<\/em>&nbsp;(S.D.N.Y.)<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Blog&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/LIBOR_-_RW_blog_with_link_-_Jan_28_2015.46142829.doc\">article<\/a>&nbsp;in Wolters Kluwer&nbsp;<em>Connect<\/em>&nbsp;on antitrust injury in context of Supreme Court&#8217;s decision allowing&nbsp;immediate appeal&nbsp;of New York federal district court&#8217;s dismissal of antitrust claim for lack of plausible showing of antitrust injury in&nbsp;<em>In re LIBOR<\/em>,:&nbsp; assessing&nbsp;rationale of&nbsp;dismissal and previewing&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/LIBOR_-_RW_article_-final_pdf-_12715-1.46143004.pdf\">longer (59-page) article<\/a>&nbsp;on same subject.&nbsp; Oral argument in Second Circuit scheduled for Niovembert 2015.<br> <\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Jan. 21, 2015.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Comment on Supreme\nCourt decision paving way for appeal of dismissal of antitrust claims in&nbsp;<em>In\nre LIBOR<\/em>:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Quotedin\nWolters Kluwer&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/LIBOR_-_Wolters-Kluwer_article_re_SCt_decision_-_12115.46141548.doc\">article<\/a>&nbsp;on Supreme Court decision that New York\nfederal district court&#8217;s March 2013 dismissal of antitrust claim was an\nappealable order, paving the way for appeal of ruling&nbsp;that plaintiffs\nfailed to plausibly allege antitrust injury.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Feb. 4, 2014.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Forex-LIBOR\ncomparison (RW press comment):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Quoted in\n&#8220;Analysis:&nbsp;&nbsp; Lawsuits over forex market face uncertain\nfuture,&#8221; (Reuters) (describing worldwide investigations of alleged\nmanipulation of the WM\/Reuters fix, a key foreign exchange\nrate&nbsp;benchmark). Quoted regarding possible comparison between\ncollaborative setting of LIBOR benchmark and&nbsp;no antitrust injury from\nalleged manipulatoin of LIBOR, according to March 2013 ruling of S.D.N.Y.\ndistrict court, and the setting of the WM\/Reuters fix, and implications of\nLIBOR holding on Forex suits.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Sept. 20, 2013.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Panelist,\n&#8220;FRAND determination and antitrust:&nbsp; what is a fair FRAND&#8221;&nbsp;\n&#8211; International League of Competition Law, Annual Conference, Kiev, Ukraine.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Presentation on\nstandard setting and licensing commitments to standard setting organizations\nunder U.S. antitrust and intellectual property law.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">April 5, 2013.&nbsp; Public Comment to DOJ and\nFTC on Patent Assertion Entities:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Submitted in response\nto request for public comments following Dec. 2012&nbsp;DOJ-FTC Hearing on\nPatent Assertion Entities, available&nbsp;at&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.ftc.gov\/os\/comments\/pae\/pae-0066.pdf\">http:\/\/www.ftc.gov\/os\/comments\/pae\/pae-0066.pdf<\/a>.&nbsp; Cited in E. Mintzer and S. Munck,\n&#8220;The Joint U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission\nWorkshop on Patent Assertion Entity Activities &#8212; &#8216;Follow The\nMoney&#8217;,&#8221;&nbsp; 79 Antitrust L. J. 423, 441 n.92, 442 n.93 (2014).&nbsp;\nAlso adapted for publication in&nbsp;<em>Antitrust Connect<\/em>, Wolters Kluwer\nantitrust blog (May 8, 2013) (<a href=\"http:\/\/www.antitrustconnect.com\/\">http:\/\/www.antitrust<\/a>connect.com).&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">March 27, 2012.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Panelist,\n&#8220;Three Faces of Frand:&nbsp; The Evolving Understanding of Standards\nEssential Patents,&#8221; ABA webinar, Science &amp; Technology and Intellectual\nProperty Sections:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Teleconference discussion\nof FRAND licensing terms for standards essential patents in context of\nGoogle-Motorola Mobility and other recent acquisitions of IP\nportfolios,&nbsp;EC and DOJ review, and competitive effects of strategic uses\nof IP rights.&nbsp; Audio available upon request.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Jan. 24, 2012.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Connecticut AG\nAnnounces Latest Settlement with DRAM Manufacturers &#8211; (RW press comment):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>On Janurary 23rd, the\nConnecticut Attorney General announced a $175,000 settlement with four\nmanufacturers of dynamic random access memory for alleged price-fixing.&nbsp;\nThis is just the latest recovery from long-running federal, state and private\nclass action multi-enforcement efforts regarding alleged price-fixing by a\nnumber of DRAM manufacturers (2002 DOJ action &#8212; $730M; attorneys general multistate\nsettlement in 2002 &#8212; $173M; private class actions on behalf of indirect\npurchasers).<\/li>\n\n\n\n<li>RW was quoted in an\narticle in&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review<\/em>&nbsp;on the settlement:&nbsp;\n&#8220;Richard Wolfram, an independent antitrust practitioner in New York, says\nmultiple enforcers seeking duplicative recovery for the same conduct is\nincreasingly common in the US.&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8216;We&#8217;ve seen this play out in cases\nagainst Mylan, Nine West, Microsoft and vitamins manufacturers, among many\nothers,&#8217; he says.&nbsp; &#8216;Judge&nbsp;Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit has\ncalled this&nbsp;&#8216;the cluster bomb effect&#8217;, but whatever the criticisms over\njudicial inefficiency and duplicative recoveries, it has become the norm over\nthe last 20 years or so&#8217;.&#8221;&nbsp;&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review<\/em>,\nonline news article, 1\/24\/12.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Jan. 17, 2012.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>On the\nRadar:&nbsp; Massive&nbsp;Credit Card Interchange Fee Multidistrict Litigation\n&#8211; (RW press comment):&nbsp;<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A multidistrict credit card interchange fee antitrust litigation (<em>In re Payment Card Interchange Fee and Merchant Discount Antitrust Litigation<\/em>, E.D.N.Y.) is finally beginning to capture media attention, more than six years after it was filed&nbsp;??&#8211; and none too soon for&nbsp;a case with&nbsp;potential liability estimated at upwards of $100B.&nbsp; The case pits&nbsp;a&nbsp;putative class of some five million retail&nbsp;merchants and additional opt-out individual plaintiffs&nbsp;against&nbsp;Visa, Mastercard and a handful of &#8220;issuing&#8221;&nbsp;(cardholders&#8217;) banks and&nbsp;&#8220;acquiring&#8221; (merchants&#8217;) banks.&nbsp; Plaintiffs allege that the defendants violated antitrust laws by agreeing to fix anticompetitive rates for interchange fees paid by merchants on&nbsp;credit card transactions.&nbsp; One of the key issues before the court on pending&nbsp;motions for summary judgment is&nbsp;the plaintiffs&#8217; standing&nbsp;to sue&nbsp;for the alleged overcharges, under federal antitrust doctrine which denies standing to indirect purchasers except in limited circumstances.&nbsp;&nbsp;RW was quoted in a recent article in&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review&nbsp;<\/em>evaluating possible pressure on the defendants to settle the long-running, outsized case, and&nbsp;focused on the question of standing:&nbsp;&nbsp;&#8220;Richard Wolfram, an independent antitrust practitioner in New York, says the case is highly complex in many aspects, but one significant problem for both sides is the issue of whether the alleged overcharges can be categorised as direct or indirect antitrust injuries suffered by the plaintiffs. This is important because under the federal antitrust&nbsp;<em>Illinois Brick<\/em>&nbsp;doctrine, only direct purchasers may recover damages for overcharges.&nbsp; Wolfram continues:&nbsp; &#8216;For example, the defendants say the merchants don&#8217;t have standing to sue as direct purchasers as they don&#8217;t pay [the interchange fees] directly.&nbsp; Instead, as a contractual matter, the merchants&#8217; banks pay the fees to the cardholders&#8217; banks and recoup the sum from the merchants.&#8217;&nbsp; Meanwhile, &#8216;the plaintiffs say the economic reality should trump the formal contractual relationship in this case&#8217;, he says.&#8221;&nbsp;&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review<\/em>&nbsp;online news article, Jan. 17, 2012.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Nov. 17, 2011.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Jury Rejects $4B\nRDRAM Antitrust Suit by Rambus &#8211; (RW press comment):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>A California state court jury rejected claims by Rambus that Hynix and Micron fixed prices and conspired to prevent Rambus&#8217;s RDRAM memory technology from becoming an industry standard, causing Rambus to lose some $4B in royalties (or $12B after antitrust trebling).&nbsp;&nbsp;Rambus filed suit in 2004;&nbsp;the jury deliberated for eight weeks following some 15 weeks of trial.&nbsp;&nbsp;RW quoted in&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review<\/em>&#8216;s daily online news regarding the verdict.&nbsp; For persuasive&nbsp;explanation&nbsp;for Rambus&#8217;s defeat, see&nbsp;also&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/alison-frankel\/2011\/11\/18\/how-the-ghost-riders-theory-won-rambus-trial\/\">http:\/\/blogs.reuters.com\/alison-frankel\/2011\/11\/18\/how-the-ghost-riders-theory-won-rambus-trial\/<\/a>:&nbsp; &#8216;yes, there was price-fixing, defendants acknowledged, but not&nbsp;<em>this<\/em>&nbsp;price-fixing and Rambus&#8217;s technology failed&nbsp;because of its own problems&#8217;.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">April 28, 2011.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>IOM Urges Reform\nof Standard Setting in Clinical Practice Guidelines:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>At the end of March,\nthe influential&nbsp;Institute of Medicine of the National Academies in\nWashington, D.C. proposed standards for the development of clinical practice\nguidelines (CPGs) in medicine&nbsp;and issued an accompanying 250-page report\ncalling for significant reform in the development of CPGs.&nbsp;&nbsp;Clinical\npractice guidelines and evidence-based medicine are taking&nbsp;center stage in\nhealth care&nbsp;practice and policy and the IOM&#8217;s call for reform is likely to\nreverberate throughout government and the private sector.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;As\nan example of the need for CPG reform, the IOM prominently cites an\ninvestigation and&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1307736824&amp;k=i1&amp;v=azdDP_iqCisnzU0MDz3VjLJWYQnqZCxsGLhTjS2mS2J58UYoizFpjRXOyklEmQesDO.oz2i1oLxpki4I2w--~A&amp;y=GM3fmg_H_bx8RI2tUgPf0a1QcZQ-~A\">settlement<\/a>&nbsp;in 2008 by the Connecticut Attorney\nGeneral&nbsp;regarding&nbsp;guidelines developed by the Infectious Diseases\nSociety of America (IDSA) for the diagnosis and treatment of Lyme disease.&nbsp;\n(As antitrust counsel to&nbsp;various complainants in the long-running\nmatter,&nbsp;RW&nbsp;presented, with co-counsel,&nbsp;a putative&nbsp;antitrust\ncase to the AG alleging process abuse in the development of the guidelines &#8212;\nas standards &#8212; by financially interested panelists, and implementation of the\nguidelines&nbsp;by the IDSA, with resulting harm to competition for treatment\nmodalities and antitrust injury.&nbsp; See below.)&nbsp;&nbsp;The IOM&#8217;s call\nfor reform highlights the singular importance of CPG development in health care\nand anticipates, by reference to the&nbsp;Lyme investigation,&nbsp;the\npotential antitrust implications of such activity.&nbsp;&nbsp;For\na&nbsp;short&nbsp;summary and comment on the IOM&#8217;s proposed standards and\nreport and its&nbsp;discussion of the Lyme investigation as emblematic of the\nneed for reform, click&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Standard_Setting_-_IOM_Report_and_Proposed_Standards_on_CPGs_-_411.142233415.doc\">here<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Jan. 6, 2011.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Article on &#8216;Most\nFavored Nations&#8217; Clauses:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>&nbsp;&#8220;&#8216;Most\nFavored Nations&#8217; Clauses under the Spotlight:&nbsp;&nbsp;<em>U.S. v.&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1299258837&amp;k=i1&amp;v=V93wmQaqCisbN2wIqtiTWjdFtP8zgtA5ki29axfq7BMx9uOZYsRV4hKAMhoeD7JfKpobzccAugyiUyp9Vg--~A&amp;y=kPhHOT0hMPtyzZ4OSRDzTd90bus-~A\"><em>Blue Cross<\/em><\/a><em>&nbsp;<\/em><a href=\"http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1298410707&amp;k=i1&amp;v=SammF5mqCitU7D16UK5yywntUoHTNPIrSMUocHbl6JPHG06sMKBY7qUzyNZ7aGeB9Du92JYNtz.Sr6w5Qw--~A&amp;y=VSlkTTk12MgtkAMholmPDCvYiCk-~A\"><em>Blue Shield<\/em><\/a><em>&nbsp;of Michigan<\/em>&nbsp;&#8212; When Might Otherwise Competitively\nNeutral or Procompetitive MFN Clauses Violate the Antitrust Laws?&#8221;,\nWolters Kluwer Law &amp; Business, Antitrust Blog,&nbsp;<a href=\"http:\/\/antitrustconnect.com\/\">http:\/\/antitrustconnect.com<\/a>.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"has-small-font-size\">Nov. 15, 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Litigation &#8212; IP\/Antitrust:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>As member of&nbsp;antitrust\/litigation team,&nbsp;helped defeat motion to dismiss antitrust and patent misuse counterclaims and affirmative defenses in federal district court on behalf of defendant \u2018aggregator\u2019 of&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/home\/admin\">flash memory technology<\/a>&nbsp;products against patentee claiming infringement.&nbsp; Defendant alleges that plaintiff\u2019s licensing demands violate federal and state antitrust laws and constitute patent misuse.&nbsp; Order denying motion to dismiss, W.D. of Wisconsin, 11\/15\/10 (26 page opinion).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Oct. 13, 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>ABA teleseminar:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Organizer\/co-moderator\/ panelist, \u201cThe Draft EU Guidelines on Standard Setting,\u201d ABA&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1298410707&amp;k=i1&amp;v=SammF5mqCitU7D16UK5yywntUoHTNPIrSMUocHbl6JPHG06sMKBY7qUzyNZ7aGeB9Du92JYNtz.Sr6w5Qw--~A&amp;y=VSlkTTk12MgtkAMholmPDCvYiCk-~A\">Science and Technology<\/a>&nbsp;and&nbsp;Antitrust Sections.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>July 13, 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Litigation \u2014 Monopolization,&nbsp;Anticompetitive Agreements:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>As antitrust counsel on team acting on behalf of plaintiff BanxCorp, helped defeat defendant Bankrate\u2019s third and final motion to dismiss claims for exclusive dealing, price fixing, predatory pricing and monopolization under federal and state antitrust law.&nbsp; Order denying motion to dismiss, D. of New Jersey, 7\/13\/10.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Aug. 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Co-author, article on&nbsp;<\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1290563563&amp;k=i1&amp;v=jeWD2ziqCis0bIT3ui2p6x3VcvpVtFF4VM8giKMRD94Vyx9nzTyx56bWUyB.eyDTaD6UH.xgFWnqct_bXw--~A&amp;y=anM2frMWr1kYDrEJabhEu7IIH80-~A\"><strong>application<\/strong><\/a><strong>&nbsp;of antitrust standard setting principles to&nbsp;clinical practice guidelines:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>\u201cEvidence-Based&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1290563563&amp;k=i1&amp;v=jeWD2ziqCis0bIT3ui2p6x3VcvpVtFF4VM8giKMRD94Vyx9nzTyx56bWUyB.eyDTaD6UH.xgFWnqct_bXw--~A&amp;y=anM2frMWr1kYDrEJabhEu7IIH80-~A\">Clinical Guidelines<\/a>:&nbsp; An Rx for Better Quality, an Opportunity for Exclusionary Conduct, or a Little of Both,\u201d&nbsp;<em>Connections<\/em>, Am. Health Lwyrs Assoc\u2019n&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>May, June, 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong><em>American Needle v. NFL<\/em>&nbsp;(S.Ct.) and&nbsp;<em>Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour Inc.<\/em>&nbsp;(3rd Circuit):<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Can the members of sports leagues and associations, like partners in any joint venture, be deemed to agree with each other regarding their joint activities, within the meaning of Section 1, or do they collectively constitute a single entity or enterprise, such that they are immune from liability under Section 1?&nbsp; The much anticipated decision by the Court in&nbsp;<em>American Needle<\/em>&nbsp;articulated a \u2018new\u2019 test that is in fact consistent with and thus does not upset&nbsp; precedent on the question:&nbsp; their conduct will typically be reviewed under Section 1 under the rule of reason.&nbsp; Meanwhile \u2014 in a case in which&nbsp;RW&nbsp;represented a foreign national tennis federation as an unnamed defendant \u2014&nbsp;the Third Circuit explicitly anticipated \u2018single entity\u2019 guidance from the Court regarding the legality under Section 1 of decisions reorganizing ATP tournament play.&nbsp; But then, one month after&nbsp;<em>American Needle<\/em>&nbsp;came down, the Third Circuit dodged the question of whether the ATP\u2019s decisions&nbsp;constitute concerted activity or instead&nbsp; conduct by a single entity.&nbsp; For futher discussion, click here.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>January&nbsp;6, 2010.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong><em>Nokia v. Apple \u2014&nbsp;<\/em>Spotlight on ETSI\/FRAND reciprocity provision:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Nokia sued Apple in federal district court in&nbsp;October&nbsp;\u201909 for infringement of wireless intellectual property&nbsp;rights; Apple counterclaimed in December, alleging patent \u2018holdup\u2019 in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1290481162&amp;k=i1&amp;v=mh.4AZ.qCivwkYWUOywul67_DI61xQWO3lGMmkNQQO4YiXqpbivwuLR4.rFEmSyzT2t3HwwVvxy9Rg5q7Q--~A&amp;y=7Ef4mLfYnwprr4IeNfzjwpqZl0Q-~A\">wireless technology<\/a>.&nbsp; (The&nbsp;backdrop is Nokia\u2019s alleged commercial missteps in allowing Apple to establish firm lead in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/admin?pageEvent=load-dialog+\/_ySmbWs\/welcome_back\/admin&amp;t=1290481162&amp;k=i1&amp;v=mh.4AZ.qCivwkYWUOywul67_DI61xQWO3lGMmkNQQO4YiXqpbivwuLR4.rFEmSyzT2t3HwwVvxy9Rg5q7Q--~A&amp;y=7Ef4mLfYnwprr4IeNfzjwpqZl0Q-~A\">smartphone<\/a>&nbsp;sector.)&nbsp; Nokia was obligated by its participation agreement with the&nbsp;European&nbsp;Telecommuni-cations Standards Institute (ETSI) to offer licenses to its ETSI-standardized wireless technology on FRAND (\u201cfair, reasonable and non-discriminatory\u201d) terms (as generally required by standards setting organizations\/SSOs) \u2014 which it allegedly did to 39 other licensees.&nbsp; From Apple, however, Nokia exceptionally sought \u2018grantback\u2019 licenses \u2014 to Apple\u2019s smartphone technology.&nbsp; Arguably supporting Nokia\u2019s demand is an ETSI&nbsp;provision which&nbsp;by its terms conditions an ETSI licensor\u2019s FRAND licensing obligation on a right of reciprocity from its licensee.&nbsp; The meaning and effect of this reciprocity provision, in the licensing rules of one of the world\u2019s most important SSOs for wireless technology, are untested in U.S. courts.&nbsp; See&nbsp;\u2018Friends and Clients\u2019&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Nokia_v_Apple_-_Friends_and_Clients_e-mail_-_1610.5195818.doc\">e-mail<\/a>, more detailed&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Nokia_v_Apple_--_comment_focusing_on_reciprocity.5194317.doc\">comment<\/a>,&nbsp;and articles in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Nokia_-_GCR_re_Nokia_v_Apple_-_121609.5194407.pdf\"><em>Global Competition Review<\/em><\/a>&nbsp;and Swedish business daily&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Nokia_v_Apple_-_Dagens_Industri_-_121609.5194459.pdf\"><em>Dagens Industri<\/em><\/a>, quoting RW.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Oct. 23, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Antitrust developments in resale price maintenance:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Assistant Attorney General Christine Varney recently proposed a structured rule of reason&nbsp;for RPM arragements under federal law.&nbsp;&nbsp;Taking her cue from the Supreme Court\u2019s invitation to lower courts in&nbsp;<em>Leegin<\/em>&nbsp;\u2014 which overturned the treatment of RPM as&nbsp;<em>per se<\/em>&nbsp;illegal \u2013\u2018to devise rules and even presumptions\u2019&nbsp;for applying the rule of reason, AAG Varney provides a compelling, straightforward and&nbsp;manageable model for balancing&nbsp;procompetitive and anticompetitive aspects of RPM \u2014 one which&nbsp;may prove highly influential to advocates and courts. For&nbsp;short RW summary, see&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/RPM_-_AAG_Varney_speech_-_1009_-_Analysis.296151107.doc\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">\u201cAAG Varney Proposes a Structured Rule of Reason for RPM under&nbsp;<em>Leegin<\/em>&nbsp;\u2014 A Summary and Appraisal.\u201d<\/a>&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>Oct. 14-15, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Meetings with FTC and DOJ&nbsp;on standards and open source:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Participated in briefings with&nbsp;FTC and DOJ officials as \u2018delegate\u2019\/member of the Committee on Standards and Open Source of the American Intellectual Propertly Law Association; other delegates included in-house counsel at several major high-tech companies and other private attorneys.&nbsp; RW comments focused on current antitrust and \u2018equitable estoppel\u2019 issues&nbsp;in this area.&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>July 30, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Unprecedented&nbsp; hearing by reconstituted guidelines panel on Lyme disease<\/strong><em>&nbsp;\u2014&nbsp;<\/em>pursuant to Connecticut Attorney General\u2019s 18-month antitrust investigation and May 2008 settlement regarding the development of clinical guidelines on Lyme disease&nbsp;by the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA) \u2014 followed by issuance of final report by panel in spring 2010:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>On July 30, 2009, a reconstituted IDSA Lyme guidelines panel&nbsp;held a full-day hearing in Washington, D.C., as provided by the settlement,&nbsp;to evaluate the science and determine whether or not it supports the current guidelines.&nbsp; Sixteen scientists and doctors and two patient advocates made presentations to the nine-member panel, which&nbsp;was charged with weighing&nbsp;the evidence and&nbsp;issuing a report.&nbsp; The hearing was broadcast live over the internet and was available&nbsp;for viewing on the IDSA\u2019s website&nbsp;(go to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.idsociety.org\/Content.aspx?id=15026\">http:\/\/www.idsociety.org\/Content.aspx?id=15026<\/a>).&nbsp;&nbsp;See press:&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.greenwichtime.com\/ci_12955324?IADID=Search-www.greenwichtime.com-www.greenwichtime.com\">http:\/\/www.greenwichtime.com\/ci_12955324?IADID=Search-www.greenwichtime.com-www.greenwichtime.com<\/a>.&nbsp;&nbsp; The&nbsp;hearing was&nbsp;the culmination of&nbsp;more than three years of&nbsp;antitrust and other&nbsp;advocacy by RW and a colleague on behalf of various patient and&nbsp;physician associations and a diagnostics laboratory, which likened the guideline development process to standard setting.and focused on process integrity and commercial conflicts of interest on the part of the previous IDSA panel.&nbsp; See&nbsp;<strong>Practice<\/strong>&nbsp;and&nbsp;<strong>Articles &amp; Commentary<\/strong>, below; see also RW June\/09&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Lyme_-_JAMA_-_RW_609_ltr_and_Gostin_reply.19691225.pdf\">letter&nbsp;(followed by&nbsp;reply)<\/a>&nbsp;to the editor&nbsp;of the Journal of&nbsp;the American Medical Association responding to&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Lyme_-_JAMA_commentary_criticizing_AG_investigation_and_settlement_-_21109.19690852.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">Feb.\/09 Commentary<\/a>&nbsp;in JAMA criticizing the AG\u2019s intervention.&nbsp;The review and voting process, although carried out internally under the supervision of the IDSA,&nbsp;were nonethless subject to some AG oversight, and offer a glimpse into some of the difficult steps of implementing evidence-based medicine in a manner consistent with the law.&nbsp; In the spring of 2010 the reconstituted panel issued its report, finding essentially no reason to revise the guidelines in light of the evidence presented at the hearing.&nbsp; For&nbsp;more details and comment on the need for guidance on the appropriate evidentiary standard when formulating or reviewing clincal practice guidelines, click&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Lyme_-_Website_Comment_-_Further_Details_and_Comment_on_Lyme_Settlement_Procedure.142232941.doc\">here<\/a>.&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>July 16,2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Google\/antitrust:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Quoted in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/GCR_-_online_article_re_Google_free_products_-_71609.209161136.pdf\"><em>Global Competition Review<\/em>&nbsp;daily online news<\/a>&nbsp;regarding Google\u2019s offering of \u2018free\u2019 services \u2014 antitrust implications, if any, and&nbsp;DOJ scrutiny of Google\u2019s conduct.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>July 15, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Article on Standard setting\/<em>Rambus<\/em>:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li><a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Rambus_-_GCR_pdf_-_July_2009.19692629.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\">\u201cDown the rabbit hole with&nbsp;<em>Rambus<\/em>\u201c<\/a>&nbsp; (see&nbsp;<strong>Articles&nbsp;&amp; Publications<\/strong>) \u2014 feature article in&nbsp;&nbsp;July 2009 issue of&nbsp;<em>Global Competition Review<\/em>&nbsp;magazine (<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.globalcompetitionreview.com\/features\/issues\/current\/\">http:\/\/www.globalcompetitionreview.com\/features\/issues\/current\/<\/a>).&nbsp;&nbsp;<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>June 2, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Effects of GM bankruptcy on viability of Saab:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Quoted&nbsp;in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Dagens_Industri_-_GM_bktcy_effect_on_Saab_-_Sect_547_transfer_-_RW_-_6209.196125124.pdf\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noreferrer noopener\"><em>Dagens Industri<\/em><\/a>(Swedish business daily).<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n\n\n\n<p>&nbsp;Feb. 23, 2009.&nbsp;&nbsp;<strong>Standard Setting \u2013&nbsp;<em>Rambus<\/em>:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<ul class=\"wp-block-list\">\n<li>Quoted in&nbsp;<a href=\"https:\/\/web.archive.org\/web\/20221207023140\/http:\/\/www.rwolframlex.com\/yahoo_site_admin\/assets\/docs\/Rambus_-_GCR_article_re_denial_of_cert_-_22309.209161405.pdf\"><em>GCR<\/em>&nbsp;daily online news<\/a>&nbsp;regarding Supreme Court\u2019s denial of&nbsp;<em>certiorari<\/em>&nbsp;in&nbsp;<em>Rambus&nbsp;v. FTC<\/em>.&nbsp; (RW co-authored one of seven&nbsp;<em>amicus<\/em>&nbsp;briefs in support of FTC\u2019s unsuccessful petition for Supreme Court review.)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Richard Wolfram is an independent U.S. lawyer based in New York City.&nbsp; His practice, launched in 2005,&nbsp;focuses on antitrust counseling and litigation on behalf of corporations, professional organizations and public advocacy entities.&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; Drawing on his 36 years of experience in antitrust and 39 years&nbsp;in&nbsp;commercial litigation, Mr. Wolfram&nbsp;focuses on helping each client achieve its objectives through &hellip; <\/p>\n<p class=\"link-more\"><a href=\"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading<span class=\"screen-reader-text\"> &#8220;Richard Wolfram, Esq.&#8221;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"parent":0,"menu_order":0,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","template":"","meta":{"footnotes":""},"class_list":["post-14","page","type-page","status-publish","hentry"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/page"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=14"}],"version-history":[{"count":29,"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":354,"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/pages\/14\/revisions\/354"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/rwolframlex.com\/Test\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=14"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}